Theological wisdom and the "word about the cross:" the rhetorical scheme in I corinthians 1-4 by Lampe, Peter
ciu.s I uter^-re.'fcLft'gi* 44 1440J
m -13.1
Theological Wisdom and the “Word About 
the Cross ”
The Rhetorical Scheme in I Corinthians 1—4
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Professor of New Testament
Union Theological Seminary in Virginia
Aware of the party strife that plagued the church 
at Corinth, Paul addresses it briefly and then 
begins a discourse on wisdom that seems unrelated 
to the problem of parties—but perhaps not so 
unrelated after all.
The Exegetical Problem to be Treated1
THE SITUATION in Corinth was not pretty. Competing groups had plunged the community into strife (3:3-4; 1:10-11). The members of 
one group were boasting, “I belong to Paul”; those of another group were 
bragging, “I belong to Cephas”; still others were saying, “I belong to Apol- 
los” (3:22; 1:12). Each group praised its own apostle (3:21; cf. 1:29, 31) and 
correspondingly disparaged the respective apostles of the other parties (4:6; 
cf. 4:3, 5).2
1. Only one problem of the disputed 1 Cor. 1 —4 chapters will be approached with a new 
solution in this article. I offer a detailed discussion of I Cor. 1—4 and the corresponding 
exegetical literature in my forthcoming book AdEcclesiae Unitatem. The material of the article 
in hand was presented as a guest lecture in Wuppertal-Barmen in May 1989.
2. “I belong to Christ” (1:12) hardly represents a Corinthian slogan but a rhetorical 
formulation by Paul himself, exposing the absurdity of the party slogans. See the reasons 
listed, e.g., by Philipp Vielhauer, Geschichte der urchristlichen Uteratur (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1975), pp. 135-37.
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Why did each party praise its “own” apostle? Because they apparendy 
valued his “wisdom.” The frequent occurrence of sophia in I Corinthians 1—- 
3 (sixteen times), which otherwise appears just three dmes in Paul’s usage, is 
best explained by the assumpdon that Paul picked up on a key word of the 
Corinthians here: They clearly believed themselves to be wise (3:18-20; 
4:10; cf. 1:5). To link the Corinthians’ arrogance about their wisdom with 
their party disorder is within reason, because both elements are treated in 
chapters 1—4 (mentioned together, e.g., in 3:18-22). Let us spell out this 
link: The party members praised the wisdom, the theological percepdon of 
“their” apostle. As epigones identifying themselves with “their” aposde and 
his wisdom, they praised their own wisdom; they praised their own theologi­
cal perception that they had taken over from their own apostle.
Paul’s reacdon to the party strife is surprising. He allots just eight verses 
(1:10-17) to the party dispute and does not return to speak about this 
unrest undl 3:3. In between, in 1:18—3:2, the party strife is no longer 
mentioned. Here a surprising silence about the previously addressed prob­
lem of facdons reigns for two pages—a silence to which the Corinthians 
must have “listened” with growing wonder. Not before 3:3-4 does the 
suspense end with a forte, the Corinthians now being openly scolded for 
their party strife. Their factionalism uncovers that they are sdll “babes in 
Christ”—-which sarcastically contradicts their own self-understanding (cf. 
4:8).
With what do the “silent” two pages deal? The fundamental theological 
text of 1:18—2:16, at first glance, has nothing to do with the Corinthian 
parties. Rather, in its first section especially (1:18-25), it only speaks gener­
ally about “God” and “the world,” and about non-Chrisuan “Jews and Greeks.” 
“What is the point of this fundamental theological text in regard to the 
specific problem of Chrisdan pardes?” the Corinthians might ask. Here lies 
the problem that I would like to approach with a new soludon.
The serious nature of a research problem often becomes evident in ex­
treme soludons. One such soludon was put forward by V. P. Branick, who 
sees little reladon between the homily of 1:18-31, 2:6-16, 3:18-23 and the 
Corinthian party strife. For that reason, he applies the source-cridcal scal­
pel.3 Such surgery is unnecessary if one can establish the reladonship of this 
fundamental theological text to the context of the party quarreling, but is 
that possible? Since Hans Conzelmann’s commentary, we have been accus­
tomed to speaking of a “ring composition”4 when viewing I Corinthians 1—
3. “Source and Redaction Analysis of 1 Corinthians 1—3," JBL 101, 1982, 251-69. “The 
homily was very probably written for another group” (p. 267). It “was a coherent unit before 
its insertion into the letter to the Corinthians” (p. 269). There is only a “general relevance of 
the homily to the conditions at Corinth” (p. 269).
4. “Ringkomposition.” “Cycle” in the English translation (1 Corinthians [Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1975], p. 79.
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3. Yet Conzelmann’s commentary is not quite clear about why Paul inserts 
1:18—2:16 into the discussion of the party strife and why 1:18—2:16 repre­
sents a necessary building block in the argument against the party disorder. 
What rhetorical funcdon does this “insertion” have? Is it only the interesting 
digression of an absent-minded apostle? Conzelmann’s commentary is not 
interested in rhetorical technique. For Conzelmann, Paul does not know­
ingly employ any sort of rhetorical device. This picture has changed in more 
recent studies. Wilhelm Wuellner, for example, sees Paul consciously insert­
ing rhetorical digressions in the course of his arguments, with specific argu­
mentative goals in mind.5 6According to Wuellner, one such digression is I 
Corinthians 1:19—3:20, for which the purpose is “to highlight how ‘faithful 
God is' (1:9) to those who wait for the revealing of our Lord Jesus Christ and 
as such keep or hold themselves ‘to the end guildess in the [last] day’ 
(1:7-8)” (p. 186). For Wuellner, the digression fits well into the argumenta­
tive unit of 1:1—6:11 which elaborates the alternadves of damnadon and 
salvation. Party strife, however, plays little role in this interpretadon. Ac­
cording to Wuellner, the main point of Paul’s argument in 1:1—6:11 is 
something totally different.*’As questionable as this exegesis may be, Wuell­
ner took an important step by interpreting Paul’s digressions as a deliberate 
rhetorical device. More recendy, M. Bunker also asserted that Paul con­
sciously employed rhetoric in I Corinthians 1—4.7 1:18—2:16 are character­
ized by Bunker as a rhetorical narratio between the exordium of 1:10-17 and 
the probalio of 3:1-17. Nevertheless, in Bunker’s work the reladonship be­
tween the content of 1:18—2:16 and the context of the parties remains 
unclear.
Thus, the riddle is posed to us: How is the general theological text of 
1:18—2:16 related to the specific party context? We must first look at tiiis^ 
passage by itself.
I Corinthians 1:18-25: Theological Wisdom as Wisdom of the 
World—as the Opposite Pole to the “Word About the Cross”
“The word about the cross”—so the theological text begins in 1:18. The 
word about the cross speaks about the cross as the place where God meets
5. “Greek Rhetoric and Pauline Argumentation” in Early Christian Literature and the 
Classical Intellectual Tradition, in honor of R. M. Grant, ed. W. R. Schoedel and R. L. Wilken, 
ThH54 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1979), 177-88.
6. I have trouble following Wuellner at this point, just as I have trouble stretching out the 
complete argumentative unit to 6:11 or the digression to 3:20. For the discussion, see my 
forthcoming book (n. 1).
7. “BriefTormular und rhetorische Disposition im 1. Korintherbrief,” GTA 28 (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984), esp. pp. 51-59. Whether the characteristics of narratio 
indeed hold true for 1:18—2:16, and whether the probatio, the proving part of the speech, lies 
only in 3:1 — 17, needs further exploration.
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humanity, saving them, or sentencing them in case they do not acknowledge 
God’s presence at this place of contempt (1:18, 20-21). Thus, the word 
about the cross speaks about God’s self, which is exacdy the reason why 
“Jews and Greeks” shake their heads. To connect the powerful God with the 
weakness of the cross, thus to announce the power as weakness and, conse­
quently, the weakness as power (1:18, 24-25) is offensive and foolish in the 
eyes of the world (1:23).
Paul’s text now establishes an absolute contrast between God and the 
word about the cross on the one hand and the wisdom of the world on the 
other hand. God has made this wisdom a folly (1:20). The world is perishing 
with its wisdom (1:18-19). Exegetically, there is no dispute so far. The 
problem is: What does the text mean by “wisdom of the world”? A further 
step is to ask why this “wisdom of the world” fails so radically.
What does the text mean by “wisdom of the world”? In spite of all the 
exegedcal disagreement about verse 1:21, this verse defines more precisely 
what kind of “world wisdom,” rejected by God, Paul has in mind in 1:20. Not 
every human knowledge about any given topic—physics or medicine, for 
instance—-is under debate in our text (at least not primarily). Paul has 
something more specific in mind: “The world did not know God through 
wisdom” (1:21). Paul aims specifically at the human wisdom about God as 
“wisdom of the world,” at “theo-logy” as “wisdom of the world.”
That the theological endeavor of the world is the focus of the debate is 
also demonstrated by 1:22, where the Jews demand signs. One asks, “For 
what?” They are hardly signs to assist physical or arithmetical comprehen­
sion. The Jews demand that religious claims be legidmized by powerful 
proofs “from above. ” The issue for Paul is that the Jews demand forceful 
evidence from God whenever anyone stands up and asserts something 
about God in the name of God. The examples are numerous.8
By targeting the theological endeavor of the Jews in 1:22 and then setdng 
up the Jews and Greeks as parallel, Paul shows he has something analogous 
in mind about the Greeks: They too “search for wisdom” about God. Paul 
focuses on their theo-sophy. Indeed, many texts demonstrate that the Greek 
search for wisdom often enough peaks in theological perception.9
8. Cf., e.g., Mark 8:11-12; Matt. 12:38-39; 16:1; Luke 11:16; John 6:30-31; II Kings 
20:1-11/Josephus Antiquities 10.28-29; Judg. 6:36-40; Exod. 4; cf. 4:30-31 /Philo De Vita Mosis 
1.76; Josephus Jewish War 6.285, 295; 1.331-32; Antiquities 20.167-70; Sifre Deuteronomium 
18.19, par. 177 (108a); The Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 98a; 93b; Pesiqtha Rabbathi 36 (162a); 
Exodus Rabba 9 (73b); The Babylonian Talmud, Baba Metzia 59b.
9. In the thought world of the first and second centuries A.D., in which an academic- 
peripatetic mixture formed the basis for the general Greek-philosophic education, the 
interest in the afterlife and in the immortality of the soul was rekindled. The decidedly 
religious goal of middle Platonism, e.g., is well known: Attikos in Eusebius Praeparatio evangelica
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A further indication that Paul aims primarily at the J/^ological wisdom of 
human beings in I Corinthians 1:18-25 is offered by the grammateusin 1:20, 
the Jewish scribe, thus somebody who thinks he knows something about 
God. Just this theo-logian is questioned: Where are you? God will make you 
ashamed.
Paul now diametrically opposes the word about the cross to human theo­
logical wisdom—the latter being condemned by that word. The text illus­
trates this power of the word about the cross in several places (1:19, 20, 25). 
There is only enough space to illustrate one example here: In verses 1:22-25 
the shattering of human religious expectadons is brought forward clearly. 
Jews and Greeks are treated by Paul in a parallel manner. Let us first look at 
what he states about the Jews. One can paraphrase: Since (epeide) the Jews 
demand signs, that is, powerful proof from above (22), the Christians offer 
them a sign from above, namely, Christ’s cross (23a). Yet this “sign” is 
something completely different from what the Jews had expected. This sign 
is no powerful proof from above; it is a weak display from above (25), and 
therefore a skandalon. It is scandalous to link God with weakness (23).
Thus, the Jewish expectation of signs is met by the kerygma of the cross—- 
the Jews, in fact, get their “sign”—but this expectadon is met in a way that 
paradoxically falls short of their expectadon. The contradicdon of the word 
about the cross over against human expectadons can hardly be expressed 
more strongly than Paul does it here. The word about the cross shatters the 
Jewish expectations.
Certainly, the word about the cross does not only condemn, it also saves: 
When the (Jewish) people in the church accept the weak and crucified 
Christ, he becomes the power of God for them (24). That is, after their 
human theological categories are struck down, the word about the cross 
turns out to be the power of life for them (186).
Only now, after arriving at what is in total opposition to their expecta­
tions, do the Jews come to know what they originally had awaited: the 
poxuerful proof from above, but a proof totally different from what they had 
awaited. Therein lies the dialecdc and the paradox.
Paul’s statement about the Greeks is analogous. To paraphrase again: 
Since (epeide) the Greeks search for wisdom (22), the Christians offer them 
wisdom, namely, the wisdom called Christ, and him crucified (23a + 246); 
but this wisdom proclaimed to the Greeks is something completely different 
from what they had expected. This wisdom is not wise; it is folly (23). It 
makes God a fool in human eyes (25a).
15.13; Albinos Didascalia 27; Celsus Fragment VII.45; VIII.63.B (ed. Bader);Justin Dialogus 2.6: 
Seeing God is the “Tdns of Plato’s philosophy.” Cf. also, e.g., Plutarch De Iside et Osiride 
351.C.E.; Justin Dialogus 1.3; Alexander of Aphrodisias In Aristolelis metaphysica commentaria 
171 (ed. Hayduck).
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Thus, the Greek longing for wisdom is met by the kerygma about the 
cross. The Greeks, in fact, get “wisdom,” but their expectation of wisdom is 
met in a way that paradoxically falls short of that expectadon. To human 
eyes, where wisdom was expected, foolishness is offered. The word about 
the cross shatters the Greek expectadons.
The fascinating thing is that by identifying Christ, the crucified one, with 
wisdom (sophia, 1:24, 30), Paul wrests from the Greeks one of their most 
cherished terms. Taking over the term sophia as a vessel, he empdes it of the 
associations that the Greeks have with “wisdom.” For them, it is clear: God 
cannot want to effect salvation by means of a despised cross—that is non­
sense. The Greek theological search for truth does not know what to do with 
the word about the cross. This word thwarts their expectadons.
But again, the word about the cross does not only condemn, it also saves: 
When the (Greek) people in the church accept the foolishness of a cruci­
fied savior, he becomes the wisdom of God for them (24 + 30). After their 
human theological categories were struck down, the crucified Christ turns 
out to be sophia for them.
Only now, after arriving at what is in total opposidon to their expecta­
tions, are the Greeks granted what they originally had expected: wisdom 
(24), but a wisdom totally different from what they had expected. The 
thought rings so paradoxically because Paul, in verse 24, wrests the sophia 
term from the Greeks in the same way as he deprives the sign-demanding 
Jews of the dynamis term: God’s power (dynamis) is not displayed in forceful 
signs from above; it shows its strength in the word about a weak cross (1:18).
In summary, the word about the cross as God’s power (1:18) is fundamen­
tally critical for human knowledge and expectations; in this Logos the 
saving and condemning God is met. Or in other words, precisely because God 
is absolute, the human speech about God cannot be. According to the text, 
any human theology is moved into a constant crisis by its own subject for 
discussion—by God. This subject in its power (dynamis, 1:18, 24) constantly 
withdraws itself from human theology, putting up resistance against domes­
tication. Trembling (2:3) would be the correct attitude of the theologian. 
The theologian does not possess absolute dogmas but is ready for constant 
revision and discussion, being aware that he or she may repeatedly have to 
start from scratch and that even thirty volumes of dogmatics do not permit 
one to know anything definitive which would allow one to brag trium­
phantly, “I am a Paulinist, a Lutheran, a Calvinist, or a Barthian.”
Why does God reject human theological endeavors? We saw that the text 
targets theological wisdom as wisdom of the world. We saw, secondly, that 
according to the text God destroys this theological wisdom of the world with 
the word about the cross. What then is so objectionable in human theologi­
cal striving? Is it only that for the world the word about the cross is scandal­
ous nonsense (1:18, 23)? Is it only that in the theological categories of the
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world there is no place for a God who acts in such a disgraceful event as the 
cross? Is the fault of the world, therefore, only that its categories do not 
suffice? Or is there more to it for Paul?
The parallel discussion in Romans 1:18-25 interprets our text to some 
extent. The knowledge about God inherent in people (Rom. l:19-21a, 28a) 
was distorted by them when they did not gratefully praise the living God 
(1:21, 23) but rather worshiped images of people or animals. They confused 
the creature with the Creator (1:23, 25), considering themselves “wise”— 
but in God’s eyes becoming fools (1:22). Paul here touches on the same 
terminology as in our Corinthian text (the wise becoming fools), thereby 
inviting us to consult Romans 1:18-25 as a Pauline commentary on I Corinthi­
ans 1:21.
According to Romans 1:18-25, the knowledge about God inherent in 
people becomes perverted for at least two reasons: People think they are 
able to “domesticate” the sovereign God (1:23), capturing God in images of 
creatures (Rom. 1:23, 25); and having done this, they even fancy that this 
“act of domestication” was “wise” (1:22). The domestication of God, this ob­
jectification of God when God is no longer allowed to be God, this is the sin 
of the fools. It is the sin against the First and Second Commandments.
That we are on the right track with this borrowing from Romans is dem­
onstrated by the phrase ouk egnoo kosmos in I Corinthians 1:21, which does 
not aim at knowledge alone but also at the obedient acknowledgement of 
God as Lord. So also in Galatians 4:8, “not knowing God” is paralleled with 
“you served the gods.” Again in I Thessalonians 4:5, with its ethical context, 
“knowing God” includes the acknowledgement of God’s lordship expressed 
in specific conduct.
Clearer still is I Corinthians 1:22: The Jewish demand for signs and the 
Greek demand for wisdom evidently have in common that they call for 
proof supporting divine truth. With that, Jews and Greeks “set themselves 
up as an authority that can pass judgment upon God.... They expect God to 
submit himself to their criteria. This, however, would mean that revelation 
would have to present itself as a factor belonging to the world.”10 God would 
become a mere object of human, worldly thoughts. God would be in our 
pocket.
Likewise, I Corinthians 1:18 leads in the same direction. In this verse, the 
emphasis on the powerful character (dynamis) of the word about the cross is 
conspicuous. The symmetry of the sentence would lead us to expect sophia. 
That this expectation is surprisingly not fulfilled shows that Paul attached 
importance to the term “power.” “Power” signals that this Logos is not open 
to human mastery. On the contrary, it powerfully masters human beings.
10. Conzclmann, ! Corinthians, p. 47.
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Such wisdom is not a possession that human beings can get hold of, manipu­
lating it, and being proud of it. Rather, this Logos itself takes possession of 
human beings. Both Romans 1:18-25 and I Corinthians 1:18—25 denounce 
a sinful type of theology delivered up to God’s wrath (Rom. 1:18): a way of 
speaking about God that degrades the Creator to a manageable creature.
At this point we can note a first connecdon between the fundamental 
theological unit of 1:18-25 and the Corinthian situadon. What does all of 
this mean for the Corinthians in their party strife?
God is taken hold of not only by the idolatrous heathen in Romans 
1:18-25, by the Jews demanding signs, and the Greeks searching for proof, 
but also by the Corinthians, thus by Christians pursuing a Christian theology. 
The Corinthian Christian theologians do not allow God to be God anymore 
either! Where, in Paul’s view, do they get hold of God as an “object”? Where 
do they leave out the condemning God in their speech about God? The 
answer is: at the point where they boast of a Pauline, Petrine, or Apollonian 
position—in the party strife.11 The Corinthian percepdon of God becomes 
human wisdom by being praised as Pauline, Petrine, or Apollonian wisdom, 
and not as a gift totally from God (cf. also 2:5). The Corinthians act as if 
these three apostles could command Christian theological wisdom as a 
possession or quality of theirs and as if the apostles, consequently, should be 
revered for it. In this manner, human beings are put in the limelight (1:12; 
3:3—4) where the honor is proper to God alone (3:21; 1:31).
Furthermore, the epigones boast (4:6-7) about their posidons (“I am a 
Paulinist. . .”). Every boasting about a Chrisdan posidon, however, whether 
this position is correct or not (e.g., the one of the Pauline party), is already 
godless for Paul, because it hardens the respective positions as if they were 
never susceptible to challenge. An absoludzing of one’s own theological 
position fixes God like an object, for it fails to take into account God as the 
powerfully (dynamis) acting subject who plunges the human speech about 
God into a permanent crisis, preventing the theologian from bragging (“I 
am a Paulinist. . .”) but making him or her tremble (2:3).
In other words, what Paul in a covert way reproaches the Corinthians for 
in 1:18-25 is that their Christian theology is not one ounce better than that 
of the world, that of the Jews, or that of the Greeks. Paul does not say this 
explicitly but in covert form, as a hidden meaning. This rhetorical device 
will occupy us more closely below.
The exegetical justification for applying the fundamental theological text 
of 1:18-25 to the Corinthian party strife in this way is found in chapter 3 
where the parties are openly targeted and where the world’s striving for 
wisdom (1:18—25) is put on the same level as the Corinthian striving for
11. For the possible contents of these positions see my forthcoming book (n. 1).
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wisdom. Let us look at 3:18-19. The Corinthians (in their pardes) fancy 
themselves “to be wise in this age" (3:18 = 1:20) with their Chrisdan theology, 
but God turns such “wisdom, of this world" into ‘ foolishness” (3:19 = 1:19-20). 
The Corinthians must first become ‘foolish” before they can become “wise" 
(3:18 = 1:23-24). In 1:18-25 and 3:18-19 Paul uses the same terminology, 
which shows how much 1:18-25, in fact, may be read with the Corinthians 
and their parties in mind. 3:18-19 makes the general theological reflections 
of 1:18—2:16 clear in regard to the party situation. In other words, and this 
is the rhetorical finesse, the Corinthians, at first, can accept the fundamen­
tal theological text of 1:18—2:16 as agreeable and even enjoyable, for the 
text in its foreground does not criticise them but the “world.” They can 
enjoy the “we” who are being saved (1:18), at least initially, until suddenly, 
from 3:1 on, the implications of the fundamental theological passage are 
shockingly turned against the Corinthians themselves. 1:18—2:16 is a “Tro­
jan horse” with which Paul thrusts himself into the middle of the Corinthian 
party situation. With the Corinthians lulled into security after 1:18—2:16, 
Paul can attack them openly with the discussion beginning in 3:1. We will 
return to this point in a moment.
In summary, the parallel between I Corinthians 1:18-25 and 3:18-19 
demonstrates this surprising equation: The Christian theology of the Corinthi­
ans, being so enthusiastic and so proud of possessing wisdom about God, 
stands on the same level as the wisdom of the rest of the world. Both are 
driven ad absurdum by the word about the cross. Both are equally godless. 
The wisdom of the theologians of Corinth is in no way superior to that of the 
rest of the world.
That we are on the right track with this interpretation is illustrated also by 
I Corinthians 3:1-4. In their jealousy” and “strife” (3:3), in their pride as 
apostle epigones (3:4), the Corinthians are not one step ahead of mere 
“human beings” (3:4). In regard to the wisdom-arrogance of their party 
strife, they stand on the same level as the “people of the flesh” (3:1, 3).
I Corinthians 1:26—2:5
After all this antithetical language from Paul, a theological question 
emerges. It sounds as if the word about the cross is detached from human 
theological positions, as if God spoke this word directly “from heaven,” yet 
even the word about the cross exists only in the mouths of human beings. 
The word about the cross proclaims that God is absolute and sovereign over 
human theology; it bursts open human theological expectations. On the 
other hand, the word about the cross is also a human theological word and, 
as such, unable to claim anything absolute. In other words, the theological 
proposition that God is absolute is, for its part, not absolute! “Fine,” the 
Corinthians may say, “then we do not have to take the critical and shattering
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power of the word about the cross as absolutely as you, Paul, want us to 
believe.” Has Paul entangled himself in an intellectual dilemma? Must he 
now introduce absolute revelatory propositions “dropped down from heaven” 
in order to extricate himself?12
The following context (I Cor. 1:26—2:5) indicates Paul’s thoughts ran in 
the opposite direction. 1:26—2:5 do not represent the word of the cross as 
irrefutable revelation which the Corinthians could only “swallow” or de­
cline. Rather, Paul steps down from the level of fundamental theological 
propositions (1:18-25) to the level of the everyday life of the church, 
searching there for empirical traces of the power exercised by the word about 
the cross. In place of (Schlier’s) revelatory axioms, Paul presents an empirical 
attempt! Whether we are inclined to approve of it or not, this effort by Paul 
is astonishing. Evidently, Paul takes seriously the fact that the judging word 
about the cross is itself a questionable human word, open to critical scrutiny 
even by the Corinthians who are criticised by it. In other words, the word 
about the cross, which relativizes the posiuons made absolute by human 
beings, is itself not presented as an absolute. Rather, Paul hands it over to the 
empirical judgment of the Corinthians. By empirical means, he tries to 
persuade the Corinthians to acknowledge this word and then revise their 
self-satisfied party positions. Paul does not decree revelatory axioms; he tries 
to convince by pointing to experiences the Corinthians shared.
Which experiences? Let us look at 1:26-31 first. There we see that the 
word about the cross is a power (dynamis) that leads human wisdoms, 
strengths, and expectations into a crisis. It overturns the posiuons of which 
human beings are proud. “Look,” Paul says in 1:26 (and I paraphrase), 
“when this word about the cross was proclaimed in Corinth for the first time, 
it did not call the socially strong and wise but, with a few excepdons, left 
them alone. It passed them by in order to deliver them up to destruction” 
(1:27-28; cf. 1:18). According to Paul, that provides an empirical proof that 
the strength and wisdom revered by human society are rejected and con­
victed by God. Through the proclamation of the word about the cross, God 
repudiated the ones who are considered strong and wise by the world.
Thus, Paul appeals to the Corinthians’ own experience with the procla­
mation of the cross. He entreats them to recognize the convicting power of 
this proclamation which judges human posiuons, and therefore to put an
12. Paul’s exegete Heinrich Schlier did, in fact, draw this conclusion—and converted to 
Roman Catholicism. “Kerygma und Sophia,” in Die 7sit der Kirche, 4th ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 
1966), pp. 206-32: God reveals God’s self in language, in the kerygma. The kerygma comes in 
the form of formulas by which the self-revelation of God is fixed. The human being can only 
acknowledge, without stipulation, these specific propositions of the kerygma—-and then 
unfold the kerygma in the dogma of the church. In this way, Schlier, based on I Cor. 1—2, 
arrives at a N.T. foundation for the church dogma.
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end to their veneration of human leaders. They can boast only about God 
(1:31), not about human apostles.
In 2:1 -5 we find the second empirical paradigm: Paul’s actual founding of 
the church in Corinth. He established that church by preaching nothing 
else but the word about the cross (2:2), and he did this in weakness, fear, 
and much trembling (2:3). Paul invites the Corinthian community to study 
their own foundational experience and to learn from it that the gospel 
about the cross did not have its community-forming power because of 
“persuasive words of wisdom” (peithois sophias logois), “excellent speech” 
(uperoche logou), or “human wisdom” (sophia anthropon), the things about 
which human beings could be proud and for which they could praise 
human leaders. When the cross is proclaimed and through this act a 
community is founded, human wisdom and strength do not contribute 
anything to it. God rejects them as legitimate tools. Therefore, this is the 
final point of this argument—the Corinthian parties cannot praise any 
apostle for these qualities.
I Corinthians 2:6-16
While 2:1-5 is about the way in which the apostle preaches the gospel, 
2:6-16 deals with the way in which the preacher comes to know the gospel. 
Here, too, the Pauline argument covertly targets the party strife. The 
argument’s goal can be described in this way: One comes to know the gospel 
through God's spirit (2:10-13, cf. v. 6), not through the human mind; and 
that implies not through the apostles’ human mind either, which otherwise 
could recommend these preachers for partisan praise. In opposition to the 
wrong Corinthian attitude, 2:6-16 points out that “we preach God's wisdom, 
which God predestined” (2:7); “God revealed” (2:10) . . . and so forth. The 
word “God” occurs ten times in 2:6-16. Here we encounter the argument’s 
point, and the polemic against the Corinthians. Facing the veneration of 
apostles, Paul calls out “God, God,” not “Paul,” not “Apollos,” not “Cephas”! 
In genuine theology God speaks. Therefore the glory is all God’s (1:31) and 
not the theologians'. With this we have already summed up the basic 
message of 2:6-16, space not allowing us to expand on this text so vehe­
mently debated by exegetes.13
Only one question still needs to be touched upon briefly. According to 
2:6-16, God reveals true theology. Has Paul therefore arrived at revelatory 
axioms after all, justifying Schlier and contradicting his own empirical 
attempt in 1:26—2:5? This conclusion would be mistaken. Of course, the 
word about the cross is revealed by God and is not a product of the human 
mind; therefore, human apostles cannot be praised for this Christian wis­
13. See my forthcoming book (n. 1).
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dom. On the other hand, however, this revelatory character of the word 
about the cross does not imply that Paul in the course of his argument has to 
treat it as a truth that only can be “swallowed” or declined. It is part of the 
humility of this word that it is delivered up to the empirical judgment of the 
Corinthians in spite of its revelatory character. The Corinthians need to 
decide for themselves whether they want to acknowledge the power of this 
word, which in the process of founding the Corinthian church overturned 
worldly wisdom and strength (1:26—2:5). The content of this word, God’s 
Christ untriumphantly delivered up to a human cross, corresponds to the 
way in which Paul uses this word in his argument—as delivered up to human 
empirical scrutiny and not as an axiom which triumphandy overrides every 
question.
The Rhetorical Schema
Let us repeat: In 1:18—2:16 Paul nowhere refers to the party strife directly. 
Nevertheless, I have asserted that this whole secdon not only produces 
general theological statements but, on a second level, also targets in covert 
form the specific problem of party disorder. I sum up our previous exegesis: 
1:18—25, bolstered by two empirical supports in 1:26—2:5, argues that the 
word about the cross does away with the human theological wisdom of the 
world. At first, the Corinthian readers probably enjoyed this, listening to a 
criticism of “Jews and Greeks,” undl they are surprised to discover (3:18—19) 
that they, too, with their partisan boasting about Chrisdan wisdom, had 
already been denounced in 1:18—2:5. In other words, by cridcizing “Jews 
and Greeks,” Paul at the same time accused a Chrisdan misbehavior in 
Corinth.14
Just as 1:18—2:5 covertly addressed party disorder, so do 2:6-16. In these 
verses Paul idendfies the divine spirit, not the human, as the source of 
genuine theological knowledge, thus covertly poindng out that the apostles 
were not led to their theological statements by the human mind but by 
God’s spirit. For that reason, every boasting about (human) apostles be­
comes absurd.
This, then, is the concealed argument of 1:18—2:16. Like a Trojan horse, 
it at first pleases its listeners until they are shocked to discover that they 
themselves are criticized by the same text. 1:18—2:16 has two dimensions: 
On one hand, it is general and theologically fundamental. On the other 
hand, the reader is invited to move from the general foreground to the 
background of a text, where the specific party disorder is attacked. This 
background is not openly displayed in 1:18—2:16; it is concealed, in a kind
14. THis point provides an important hermeneutical impetus for Jewish-Christian dia­
logue: The Pauline criticism of the Jews in I Cor. 1:18-25 is inseparable from a Christian self- 
criticism: in fact, it is a disguised Christian self-criticism.
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of covert speech. Paul does not stand alone with this type of covert speech. 
Especially around the middle of the first century, this method was extremely 
well liked by both speakers and listeners. The audience had to puzzle a little 
before it got behind the (second) true meaning of a statement. This covert 
mode of speech was called a schema by the rhetoricians.
We may see how this was understood by looking at Quintilian Institutio 
Oratoria 9.2 as an example. Under the “figures of thought” which “differ 
from the method of simple statement” (simplici modo indicandi, 9.2.1), Quin­
tilian subsumes emphasis (9.2.64) and schema; they can be considered as 
being related or even identical (65-91). (1) The emphasis is a figure accord­
ing to which “some hidden meaning is extracted from some phrase” (64). 
Quintilian cites an example from Virgil. In the foreground of the text Dido 
complains about marriage: “Might I not have lived, from wedlock free, a life 
without a stain, happy as beasts are happy?” In addition to the lament about 
marriage, however, in the background of the text the statement can also be 
found that Dido supposes a life without marriage is brutish. (2) The same 
structure is valid for the schema (65):
Similar, if not identical with this figure (i.e., emphasis) is another, which is much 
in vogue at the present time, . . . which is of the most common occurrence. ... It is [the 
Figure] whereby we excite some suspicion to indicate that our meaning is other 
Ilian our words would seem to imply (quod non dicimus accipi volumus); but our 
meaning is not in this case contrary to that which we express, as in the case of 
irony, but rather a hidden meaning which is left to the hearer to discover (aliud latens 
el audilon quasi inveniendum). . . . Modern rhetoricians practically restrict the 
name of figure {schema) to this device, from the use of which figured contro­
versial themes (controversiaeJiguratae) derive their name.15
The information contained in the background is not given directly {recta, 
65), but with ambiguity (ambiguitate, 68). The contemporary audience does 
not consider this thought figure as dishonest but, on the contrary, listens to
15. Disguised speech = oralio figurala = logos eschematismenos. Thus, we deal here with the 
narrow meaning ofschema, not with the general “figure of speech."Paul’s disputed metaschemalizo 
in 4:6 His in well at this point, meaning “to hint at something in a disguised speech without 
saying it expresses verlns” (cf. Philostratus Vitae Sop his larum 2.597, 2.561, 1.519; PseudoDemetrius 
l)e hlocutione 287, 292-94, 298). In a paraphrase 1 Cor. 4:6 reads like this: “For your sake I have 
clothed the thoughts of 3:5—4:2 in—-metaphorically—disguised speech about planting and 
watering, about preparing a foundation, building on it, and about examining a steward’s 
housekeeping. And 1 have applied these disguising metaphors to me and Apollos (in the 
sense that Paul planted, Apollos watered, etc.), that you may learn by us not to be puffed up in 
favor of one (apostle) against another. ” Consequently, not only 1:18—2:16 but also 3:5—4:2 is 
a schema for Paul, the unspoken background message of 3:5—4:2 being that not only Paul and 
Apollos are unworthy of Corinthian praise but also Cephas (who did not even water the plants 
in Corinth!). After the vigorous disagreement with Peter in Andoch (Gal. 2), Paul apparently 
avoids hurting this apostle's feelings directly, the schema of 3:5—4:2, nevertheless, allowing 
him to rclativize Peter’s importance in a diplomatic way.
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it with a favor (nemo non illi furto favet, 68).
Further, according to Quintilian (68; cf. also 66, 76, 79), the thought 
Figure of the schema is employed and favorably received particularly when 
the speaker is “hampered by the existence of influendal personages” whose 
feelings he or she does not want to hurt by messages directly conveyed. 
“Powerful personages” (personae potentes) being in the way, the speaker is 
confronted with this kind of forced silence (silentii necessitas). Whoever has 
ears, let them hear! In fact, Cephas and Apollos were such influential 
personages. The schema in I Corinthians 1:18—2:16 excludes any confronta­
tion with these two co-missionaries, but at the same time it enables Paul to 
argue against the party disorder. 1:18—2:16 represents a fortunate rhetori­
cal choice on the part of Paul: In the text’s background disguised by the 
schema, Paul argues against the Corinthian pardes which absoludze the 
wisdom of Paul, Apollos, and Cephas; however, thanks to the schema, he 
manages to avoid stepping openly on the toes of these two other aposdes. In 
other words, criticising the Corinthians’ praise of Apollos and Cephas, Paul 
nevertheless avoids hurting the feelings of these two with any direct state­
ment—a genuine masterpiece.
Thus, as the rhetoric suggests, the schema of I Corinthians 1:18—2:16 
hides a “ticklish” message behind a seemingly “harmless” text The seeming 
harmlessness of emphasis and schema usually is attained by replacing a spe­
cific thought which is potentially dangerous in the situation with a general 
thought (infinitum) not necessarily related to the situation.16 Paul fulfills this 
rhetorical rule exactly. The two main general thoughts (questio infinita) of I 
Corinthians 1:18—2:16 are: (1) All human wisdom of the world is bound to 
perish (1:18-25), and (2) all Christian wisdom is exclusively God’s gift 
through the spirit (2:6-16). The specific issue (questio finita), however, is the 
parties’ adoration of the apostles and their wisdom. Applying both general 
thoughts to the specific issue, one arrives at the following conclusion: Either 
the wisdom of the apostles is a human quality and therefore a reason for 
praising them—but then it is also bound to perish—or the wisdom of the 
apostles is exclusively a spiritual gift from God, jusdfying God alone as the 
object of praise. In both cases, the way is obstructed for praising apostles, 
which sums up the whole thought figure of 1:18—2:16.
We may, however, go still further with Quindlian: “If a figure is perfectly 
obvious, it ceases to be a figure. . . . Such devices are totally repudiated by 
some authorities, whether the meaning of the figure be intelligible or not” 
(9.2.69). Here Quintilian addresses the double problem of the schema which 
also holds true for the Pauline text: (1) If a figure is too obvious, it can be
16. See H. Lausbeig, Elemente der literarischen RJietorik, 3rd ed. (Munchen: Hueber, 1967), 
par. 419.
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safely dropped. (2) If a figure is too veiled, it runs the risk of not being 
understood. This fate befell the Pauline text at least in the scholarly exege­
sis, but was this also the case in Corinth? We already saw that the ears of the 
Pauline contemporaries were trained for the schema (65). It was even known 
to ordinary people (vulgo, 9.1.14)! When Quintilian started out teaching in 
Rome in A.D. 68, the schema enjoyed widespread popularity (9.2.77).
The speaker has to find a stance somewhere between both dangers (1+2) 
by observing moderation (modum adhibere, 69). Quindlian advises: The 
double-leveled text should not advertise its figure loudly, but it should rouse 
suspicion (suspicio) in the hearers’ mind that behind the foreground of the 
text a background is lurking which wants to be puzzled over (71). Quintilian 
describes the psychological advantage of the schema in this way: The hearers 
accept what they think they have found out for themselves, whereas they 
might not accept it as true if it were told them directly. It is helpful, indeed, 
for the speaker’s purpose that the hearers take pleasure in detecting the 
concealed meaning, applauding their own cleverness and regarding the 
speaker’s eloquence as a compliment for themselves (78).
That Paul at least aroused suspicion, if not perplexed wonder, with the 
text of 1:18—2:16 is quite likely: After a paranetical prelude in 1:10-17, a 
long “silence” followed in which nothing more was said directly about the 
party disorder—not unul the beginning of chapter 3. It is precisely this 
suspicion-causing “silence” that prompted us, as it almost surely prompted 
the Corinthians, to ask the question about the real meaning of these open­
ing chapters in First Corinthians.
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